The State of Utah v. Denny Alvarez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
The State of Utah v. Denny Alvarez : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
James C. Haskins; Paul Gotay; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Denny Alvarez, No. 920401 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4349
JTAH 
)OCUM: ( !- U 
>0 
A.10 
DOCKET NO.^2—— —^—nr THE UTAH COURT or APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DENNY ALVAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920401 - CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie 
A. Lewis, Judge, presiding. 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
PAUL GOTAY 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
SEP 3 1992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF COMT1MTS 
TABLE Dip AI ITI I O R I T I E S . . i i i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT, 1 
DETERK.NAT: •«• s . . . . . 2 
STATEM-N * — :^:- :\ ., .*..) STANDARDS OF R E\ IEW 1 
STATEKrNT C Thi- A.: 1 
STATE! -< *! 4 
SUMMAF ' MJ- .-.r AkGUMENI I 
ARGUMENT 
P01NT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR Bi 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE OTHER BAD 
ACTS. , 
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE FALSE 
NAME WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY CHARGE AND WAS THEREFORE NOT 
ADMISSIBLE . , , , , , 9 
1. This evidei ice in its actual fori t: t. 
at trial did, not provide admissible 
evidence that Mr. Alvarez had given 
a wrong name or date of birth. 9 
2. This evidence was impermissible 
character evidence ] 3 
B. EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT, IT 
WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAI TO MR, ALVAREZ'S 
CASE ] 5 
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE FALSE INFORMATION 
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAI , ERROR ] 8 
P : ) :i n 1 11 ATTORNEY LISA J. REMAL ' S FAILURE TO CALL A 
CRUCIAL WITNESS DENIED MR. ALVAREZ THE RIGHT 
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 2 0 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970). . 21 
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987) 18,20 
State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) 13,18 
State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982) 13 
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986) 9,10 
State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1986) 17 
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983) 12 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) 21,22 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991) . . . . 1,18,20 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) . 
21,23 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 1,4 
RULES: 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 2,9 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 2,9 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 2,5,15,18 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) 2,5,7,12,13 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 2,10,11,19 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) 3,11,19 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
DENNY ALVAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: BRIEF OF 
: Case No. 
Priority 
APPELLANT 
920401 - CA 
No. 2 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1953 as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by admitting 
evidence tending to prove other bad acts. The standard of review 
applied to errors in admission of evidence is the correction of 
error standard allowing no deference to the trial court. State 
v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). 
Was Defendant denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel because attorney Remal failed to call a witness which 
could have bolstered Defendant's testimony while undermining the 
prosecution witness's credibility? 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence 
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he 
has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to 
prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of 
the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is 
subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to 
opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 7, 1991, Denny Alvarez was arrested for 
Armed Robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953 as 
amended). On November 14, 1991 this matter was heard in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. The Defendant, 
Denny Alvarez, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and 
sentenced to a minimum term of five years imprisonment in the 
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a fine of One Thousand 
Dollars. On January 21, 1992, the Defendant appealed his 
conviction to the Utah Supreme Court. Pursuant to its authority, 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred the Defendant's appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 7, 1991 Defendant, Denny Alvarez, entered the 
Smith's Food King store at 876 East 800 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah and approached the customer service window where Vanessa 
Milton was working (R. 271). Defendant testified that he had 
been using drugs steadily for approximately a week and had hardly 
slept during that week; he also testified that he had used 
intravenous drugs, most recently just before entering Smith's (R. 
264 & 273). 
Ms Milton testified that Defendant stood at her customer 
service window with some money in one hand and told her to give 
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him "six fifties" (R. 185-186 & 197-199). When she did not 
comply with that request, she testified that he lifted his shirt 
to reveal the handle of either a knife or a gun in his waistband 
(R. 102-103). She also testified that Defendant reached towards 
the cash drawer, which was closed, and then left the store. (R. 
103). Defendant testified that he was confused because of the 
combination of the lack of sleep and the use of drugs, but that 
he was simply trying to get 6 fifty-cent pieces for the 3 one-
dollar bills he had in his hand (R. 273, 276 & 279). When it 
became clear that Ms. Milton was not going to give him the 
change, he left the store (R. 280 & 281). Defendant also 
testified that he never had any sort of weapon in the store, but 
that Ms. Milton may have seen him holding onto the too-large 
waistband of his pants in a manner which she mistook for a weapon 
handle (R. 276-278, 280). When confronted by police a short time 
after leaving the store, Defendant gave a false name because he 
knew he had violated his probation (R. 220-221). 
Prior to the beginning of trial, Defendant made a Motion in 
limine to suppress any evidence of Defendant's having given a 
false name, pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence; the court denied that motion, but limited the State's 
evidence to the fact that Defendant had given a false name, and 
did not allow any mention of Defendant's probation status. 
At the end of the presentation of the State's case in chief, 
Defendant moved to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence or, in 
the alternative, to reduce the charge to Attempted Robbery, a 
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third degree felony, because Defendant neither used a dangerous 
weapon nor threatened the use of a dangerous weapon as is 
required as an element of Aggravated Robbery; those motions were 
denied by the trial court (R. 255-261). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court allowed into evidence the testimony of 
Officer Scharman that Mr. Alvarez gave an incorrect name and date 
of birth at the time he was arrested for robbery. However, 
because Officer Scharman's testimony was not expert testimony, 
and was based upon what another officer's report says, the 
evidence should have been excluded as impermissible hearsay. 
Moreover, the evidence going to Mr. Alvarez using a 
different name and date of birth does not qualify as admissible 
character evidence because it is not probative of any element of 
aggravated robbery. 
Even if the evidence is relevant, its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon the 
defendant. The incorrect name and date of birth evidence came in 
without the benefit of Mr. Alvarez's explanation that he gave the 
wrong name to avoid arrest on a probation violation. The 
evidence was misleading to the jury, who could not hear 
Defendant's highly appropriate explanation for his behavior, and 
was therefore substantially prejudicial to the defendant. 
Defense counsel failed to call as a witness the person who 
drove Mr. Alvarez to the Smith's that morning. That witness 
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could have bolstered Mr. Alvarez's testimony while undermining 
the prosecution witness's credibility. Attorney Remal's failure 
to call this witness was unreasonable under the circumstances and 
prejudicial to Mr. Alvarez's defense. 
ARQUMMIT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE OTHER BAD 
ACTS. 
At trial, Mr. Alvarez's attorney moved that the State's 
witnesses not be allowed to testify to any use Defendant may have 
made of an incorrect name or date of birth at the time he was 
arrested on the robbery charge being tried (R. 41 & 220). It was 
proffered that Mr. Alvarez's explanation for using a false name 
would be that he was on probation for a prior robbery and he 
wanted to avoid any problems with probation (R. 220-21). The 
trial court had previously ruled inadmissible any evidence going 
to Defendant's prior convictions or probation status (R. 33 & 
220). Mr. Alvarez argued that any mention of the false name 
forced him to argue evidence that had been previously suppressed 
in his favor by the trial court (R. 221). The state argued that 
the evidence was admissible because it showed evidence of guilt 
and it undermined the stated defense that Mr. Alvarez was too 
high on drugs to think clearly (R. 222). 
The trial court ruled the evidence admissible in that the 
evidence did not constitute a crime or wrong as envisioned by 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404b (R. 223) and that it was relevant with 
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a probative value outweighing the slight prejudicial effect (R. 
222). The trial court further admonished the witness that no 
mention was to be made of probation status or prior record of Mr. 
Alvarez (R. 223). The witness, Officer Scharman, acknowledged 
that he understood the court (R. 225). 
Officer Scharman testified in front of the jury that Mr. 
Alvarez gave him the name of Joseph Madrid at the time of arrest 
and a date of birth that was too young (R. 242). The evidence 
establishing that Mr. Alvarez was not Joseph Madrid was not based 
on the officer's direct knowledge, but rather was based on 
hearsay, that is, the officer read the information in another 
officer's report (R. 243-44). Objections to the hearsay nature 
of the testimony were overruled (R. 243-44). The hearsay was 
based on a comparative fingerprint study done between arrest 
prints and "known prints of the defendant" (R. 244). 
Mr. Alvarez took the stand in his own behalf (R. 263 & ff). 
He explained that the encounter was a mistake. He was trying to 
get change in fifty-cent pieces from the service counter at 
Smith's (R. 271). He was too high to communicate (R. 273). He 
did pull his pants up but did not exhibit a knife (R. 277). He 
finally reached for his own money and left the store (R. 280). 
He never explained the name discrepancy but denied trying to rob 
Smith's (R. 283). 
The prosecutor argued in closing that Mr. Alvarez gave a 
false name to officer Scharman (R. 322). In rebuttal, he again 
argued that Mr. Alvarez lied about his name and, therefore, was 
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lying about his intent that day (R. 341). 
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE FALSE NAME WAS 
NOT RELEVANT TO THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE 
AND WAS THEREFORE NOT ADMISSIBLE. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides in part that "(e)vidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible." Utah Rule of Evidence 
401 defines "relevant evidence" as: 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence. 
Therefore, the proponent of any evidence objected to on relevance 
grounds has the burden to show that the offered evidence is 
relevant as defined above. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 
(Utah 1986) . 
1. This evidence in its actual form at trial 
did not provide admissible evidence that 
Mr. Alvarez had given a wrong name or date of 
birth. 
On direct examination, Officer Scharman testified to the 
false name and date of birth in this manner: 
Mr. Spikes: What name did he give you when you asked him 
his name? 
Officer Scharman: I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or 
something of that nature 
Q: And what date of birth did he give you? 
A: I don't recall exactly. I just recall that the date of 
birth, he was a juvenile age. 
(R. 242). Mr. Alvarez did not testify as to his date of birth or 
the use of the name Joseph Madrid (see ruling of court R. 221). 
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The only evidence offered going to show that Mr. Alvarez gave 
false information other than the interchange above was in the 
form of hearsay evidence (R. 243-44). Officer Scharman testified 
he did not realize the name might be false until later on: 
Mr. Spikes: Did you have occasion to discover that the 
name he gave you was not, in fact, his true name? 
Officer Scharman: No, sir, I didn't, not until I was 
subpoenaed and pulled the case up and read some 
supplementary reports. 
(R. 243; hearsay objection by Mr. Alvarez followed). The 
objection was overruled and the questioning continued: 
Mr. Spikes: How was it that you, in fact, found that 
there was at least some question concerning the name of 
Madrid that he gave you? 
Officer Scharman: From a follow up detective. 
Q: Do you know what process, what procedure was taken that 
would occur to determine that? 
A: There was a comparative fingerprint done from the print 
I took at the time of the arrest versus some known prints of 
the defendant. 
Q: Okay. Do you know the results of that comparison. 
(R. 243-44; hearsay objection by Mr. Alvarez again overruled). 
Then the officer testified that the name and date of birth had 
been incorrect at the time of arrest (R. 244). 
This second exchange between the prosecutor and his witness, 
which is the only evidence offered to show the information was 
false, is not admissible evidence. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence 
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he 
has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602. The witness is not competent to 
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testify to this information because he did not "have the 
opportunity . . . to perceive" the fingerprint analysis himself. 
State v. Eldredqe, 773 p.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 493 
U.S. 814 (1989). He was never gualified as an expert, nor was 
his testimony found to be the kind necessary for expert 
testimony. Therefore, he did not meet the expert exception to 
Rule 602.1 
The fingerprint testimony was inadmissible hearsay (see Utah 
Rule of Evidence 802). 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c). The officer was testifying to what 
another officer's report says, not to what he himself observed. 
That second officer was not available at trial subject to cross-
examination.2 This evidence should not have been admitted by 
the trial court. Gray at 1316. 
The evidence as offered at trial establishes that Mr. 
Alvarez probably gave the name of Joseph Madrid and perhaps gave 
a juvenile date of birth. No competent or admissible evidence 
was offered to show that these pieces of information were indeed 
false. Mr. Alvarez himself was never guestioned on these 
1
 Rule 602 also provides that "(t)his rule is subject to the 
provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert 
witnesses." 
2
 The testimony, in addition to violating rules of evidence, 
was also admitted in violation of Mr. Alvarez's right to 
confrontation of witnesses under the state and federal 
constitutions. 
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circumstances. The jury can certainly assume that Joseph Madrid 
was not the only name Mr. Alvarez was known to use. No inference 
about his date of birth can be drawn from these facts, however, 
since juveniles can be tried as adults. This does not lead to 
the inference that he told a lie about his name or date of birth. 
The prosecutor proffered that the information was relevant 
because it showed evidence of guilt (probably meaning 
consciousness of guilt) and showed that Mr. Alvarez was not too 
high to think clearly. However, the evidence which was 
admissible is not probative of consciousness of guilt. His use 
of two names, which may both be valid, does not show that he was 
lying to the officer, making it more probable than not that he 
had a consciousness of guilt. His use of two names does not make 
it more probable or less probable that he was thinking clearly. 
The evidence is not probative of any fact of consequence to this 
charge. It is not relevant, and, therefore, should have been 
excluded. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1983). 
2. This evidence was impermissible character 
evidence. 
Even if this Court finds that the evidence going to Mr. 
Alvarez using a different name or date of birth was sufficient to 
allow the jury to infer that he lied to the officer, either 
because hearsay and competence questions do not block all the 
information from being properly admitted or because even without 
the hearsay the jury could infer that he was lying, then the 
evidence must still pass muster as character evidence under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 404(b). This is so because false information is 
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a crime, but it is not a crime upon which this jury was required 
to deliberate. It is not relevant to this case. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). Evidence tending to show that Mr. 
Alvarez was a liar or that he had some other form of character 
flaw is not admissible, unless that very evidence is relevant in 
that "it tends to prove some material fact to the crime charged." 
State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah 1982). 
Therefore, character evidence may 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 404(b). The question once more is one of relevance as 
outlined above with the special problem that if this evidence is 
not especially probative of some material fact, it will be used 
by the jury to show a "general disposition of [the] defendant" to 
commit crimes and that is improper. State v. Featherson, 781 
P.2d 424, 427 (Utah 1989) . 
In a proffer, the prosecutor stated that the false 
information evidence was evidence of guilt in the aggravated 
robbery. The fact that a person gives a false name to an 
arresting officer upon arrest for aggravated robbery is not 
probative of any element of the aggravated robbery. It is not 
evidence of guilt in the sense. 
If the prosecutor meant that it was some evidence of 
consciousness of guilt going to prove the mens rea element, this 
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may be more on target. However, this case presents a special 
problem. The prosecutor might argue this evidence as tending to 
show consciousness of guilt, but Mr. Alvarez's argument is that 
he wanted to try to avoid problems because he was on probation 
for another robbery. It was stipulated by both counsel that this 
probation evidence should not be admissible. This is the most 
likely inference to be drawn from the false information evidence. 
However, the jury would never arrive at this inference, because 
it would be even more prejudicial and improper to let them know 
that Mr. Alvarez was already on probation for a robbery crime. 
The jury would most surely use this information to convict Mr. 
Alvarez for having committed this sort of crime before. Given 
all facts, the evidence is not probative of consciousness of 
guilt. It is only when the information goes to the jury in 
incomplete form as it did here that the evidence appears at all 
relevant. 
The second reason proffered is that the evidence tends to 
rebut the defense that Defendant was too high to think clearly, 
an absence of mistake kind of theory. The evidence as presented, 
even in its full form including the hearsay, does not tend to 
prove clear or unclear thinking. 
The false information evidence should have been excluded. 
It does not tend to prove any fact material to this charge. 
Instead, it functions as improper character evidence, influencing 
the jury to convict Mr. Alvarez because he may have lied to the 
officer on the collateral matter. 
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B. EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT, IT WAS 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. ALVAREZ'S CASE. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides in part that 
[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury . . . . 
If this Court finds that the evidence of the incorrect name 
and date of birth is relevant to the present case, it is only 
marginally probative. As outlined above, the critical evidence 
going to the incorrectness of the information Mr. Alvarez gave is 
hearsay and not admissible to prove that the information was 
indeed incorrect. Additionally, the interaction between the 
officer and Mr. Alvarez had more to do with Mr. Alvarez's 
probation status than his need to give a different name in the 
face of charges that he attempted to rob Smith's. That he gave 
incorrect information to the officer tells the jury little about 
his intent within the store. 
However, this evidence is highly prejudicial in several 
respects. First, the incorrect name and date of birth evidence 
came in without the benefit of Mr. Alvarez's explanation that he 
gave the wrong name to avoid arrest on a probation violation. 
Even without an arrest for robbery, he was in violation of his 
probation because he was high. The evidence was, therefore, 
misleading to the jury who could not hear Defendant's highly 
appropriate explanation for his behavior. This allowed the jury 
to assume that he had no real explanation and, therefore, must 
have been lying about his name and his intent to rob the store. 
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Trial counsel could not cure this problem by allowing Mr. Alvarez 
to explain why he gave a wrong name. The fact of his probation 
could only cause more prejudice against him with the jury. 
Second, the information is unfairly prejudicial to Mr. 
Alvarez in that it allows the jury to speculate on his intent 
within the store by referring to this action with the officer. 
The two events, while close in time, are not related. There is 
little evidence going to Mr. Alvarez's intent. The two versions 
of the events in the store are very similar in their details. 
What is different between the Smith's employee's version and Mr. 
Alvarez's version are the judgments about what his actions meant. 
This means that the jury probably looked to an allegation of 
false information to decide who to believe concerning events in 
the store. This confuses the real issue and is misleading and 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Third, officer Scharman explained the fingerprint evidence 
in this way: 
[t]here was a comparative fingerprint done from the 
print I took at the time of the arrest versus some 
known prints of the defendant. 
(R. 244). Few people have fingerprints on file with law 
enforcement agencies. A permissible inference for the jury to 
draw from this information ("known prints of the defendant") 
would be that he had been arrested before. However, this kind of 
testimony had already been excluded by stipulation (R. 225). 
Officer Scharman had been warned by the judge about making such 
statements and acknowledged that he understood (R. 225). This 
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information was extremely prejudicial to Mr. Alvarez and unfairly 
so, because it had been properly excluded by the trial court 
prior to the witness's testimony. 
In weighing the evidence's relevance versus its prejudicial 
impact, the trial court made an error. The evidence was much 
less relevant in its trial testimony than as proffered by the 
prosecutor. It was also much more prejudicial in its admitted 
than proffered form. If given an opportunity to fairly weigh the 
evidence, the trial court would have come to a different 
conclusion. Utah Appellate courts have found error in similar 
situations. 
In State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah 1986), a 
statement made by the defendant when arrested for a burglary was 
found to be admitted at trial in error. In Pacheco, the 
defendant was stopped while driving a car matching a description 
given in a burglary investigation. He consented to a search, 
which yielded fruits of the burglary. When showed a ring taken 
from the car, he responded: 
I don't know about the ring. It may have been there 
from a previous burglary that I just got out of prison 
for. 
Id. at 193. At trial, all but the portion of his statement 
concerning prison was admitted in the State's case-in-chief. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that this was prejudicial error, since 
the defendant offered no real explanation other than this 
statement for his possession of the ring. Id,, at 195. It is 
important to note that this statement as admitted gives the false 
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impression that he was admitting to the ring being a recent 
burglary. The statement as a whole makes no such admission but 
is too prejudicial to put to the jury. Mr. Pacheco and Mr. 
Alvarez were put in the same predicament and faired just as badly 
in the trial. 
In State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987), a 
conviction for possession of cocaine was reversed when drug 
ledgers of marginal probative value for the crime charged were 
introduced at trial to the unfair prejudice of the defendant. In 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 428 (Utah 1989), testimony of 
other lewd acts in proximity to the charged rape were found to be 
minimally probative on the issue of intent and highly prejudicial 
and, therefore, should have been excluded by the trial court. 
In a similar manner, all evidence going to alleged false 
information given by Mr. Alvarez to Officer Scharman at the time 
of arrest should have been excluded by the trial court. The 
evidence was of minimal probative value and unfairly prejudicial 
to Mr. Alvarez's case. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE FALSE INFORMATION 
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The standard of review applied to errors in admission of 
evidence is the correction of error standard allowing no 
deference to the trial court. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 
(Utah App. 1991). However, underlying the factual determinations 
under Rule 403 of probativeness and prejudice made by the court 
are given some deference warranting a reversal of the factual 
ruling by the appellate court only if "the trial court acted 
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unreasonably in striking the balance." Id.. In the present case, 
the trial court made several errors of the law which this Court 
should reject. 
The evidence was in part admitted in violation of Utah Rules 
of Evidence 602 and 801. This Court should find that, under the 
correction of error standard, Officer Scharmanfs testimony 
showing that the name and date of birth were in fact false should 
have been excluded as impermissible hearsay. The remaining false 
information evidence should have been excluded under Rules 401 
and 402 as not relevant to the case. Even if the evidence is 
relevant, it was error for the trial court not to apply Rule 
404(b) in its decision making. As a matter of law, 404(b) 
applies, and this bad act evidence would not be admissible under 
that rule. 
If this Court still finds some relevance in the testimony 
and reaches the Rule 403 issue, the trial court's ruling, which 
normally would be given some deference, cannot be given that 
deference here. The incorrect rulings of law happened prior to 
the weighing of fact that the trial court was obliged to do under 
Rule 403. There is no way to determine how the admission of 
improper evidence affected the factual determinations inherent in 
that balancing. This Court should look at the appropriate 
evidence before it and conduct the Rule 403 balancing test on its 
own. Such a rebalancing will show that the trial court committed 
reversible error. 
[WJhere evidence is shown to have supported only 
conjectural inferences which had little probative 
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value, or where no evidence was adduced that showed 
that a fact had any causal connection with the crime 
charged, reversal may be appropriate on grounds that 
the improperly admitted evidence could only have served 
to confuse and mislead the jury or to prejudice the 
outcome of the case. 
DeAlo at 199. 
The error was prejudicial in this case, reguiring reversal. 
Taylor at 568. The State has attempted to use this false 
information evidence to prove the intent element on the 
aggravated robbery charge. The State had three eyewitnesses 
testify to the crime itself. This was sufficient evidence for 
the jury to consider on the issue of intent (Mr. Alvarez is not 
saying that the evidence going to intent was sufficient to 
establish the requisite intent, only that the jury had all the 
information concerning the alleged crime it could possibly have). 
Mr. Alvarez's interaction with Officer Scharman offered nothing 
more for the jury on this issue. However, it did create a 
significant likelihood that the jury would convict Mr. Alvarez 
based on irrelevant matters. 
Point II ATTORNEY LISA J. REMAL'S FAILURE TO CALL A CRUCIAL 
WITNESS DENIED MR. ALVAREZ THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Counsel for Mr. Alvarez, Lisa J. Remal, called the 
defendant, Mr. Alvarez, as the only witness for the defense. 
Defense counsel failed to call a crucial witness who could have 
bolstered Mr. Alvarez's testimony while undermining the 
prosecution witness's credibility. Attorney Rental's failure to 
call this witness was unreasonable under the circumstances and 
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prejudicial to Mr. Alvarez's defense. 
A defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has been 
interpreted to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel." 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 
1441,1449 n. 14 (1970). In determining whether a defendant's 
sixth amendment right to counsel has been denied, the Utah 
Supreme Court uses the two part test set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors 
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)(quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 
(1984)). In addressing the first part of the test and 
determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, an 
"objective standard of reasonableness" is used. Id. at 186, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. Regarding the second part of the test, whether 
the defendant was prejudiced thereby, it must be shown that there 
is a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Id. at 187, 104 S.Ct at 2068. In determining 
whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome exists, 
an appellate court must "consider the totality of the evidence, 
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the 
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entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record. Templin, 805 
P.2d at 187,. 
The prosecution presented four witnesses during its case in 
chief, only one of which, Vanessa Milton, communicated with Mr. 
Alvarez during the alleged crime. Vanessa Milton testified that 
Mr. Alvarez demanded "six fifties," that is, that defendant was 
not trying to get 6 fifty-cent pieces for the 3 one-dollar bills 
he had in his hand. In presenting Mr. Alvarez's defense, 
attorney Remal presented only the defendant himself, who 
testified that his only purpose in going to Smith's that day was 
to get 6 fifty-cent pieces for the 3 one-dollar bills he had. 
Defense counsel failed to call as a witness, "Jesse" the person 
who drove Mr. Alvarez to Smiths on the morning of the alleged 
robbery (R. 271). "Jesse," in addition to driving Mr. Alvarez to 
Smith's, had, immediately prior to the alleged robbery, purchased 
some fifty-cent pieces from the defendant (R. 270-271). If 
attorney Remal had given him an opportunity to testify, he could 
have corroborated Mr. Alvarez's reason for going to Smith's, 
which was merely to get exchange his 3 one-dollar bills for 6 
fifty-cent pieces. In that "Jesse" was "kind of like an uncle" 
(R. 186) to Mr. Alvarez and directly involved in the events 
leading up to and including the alleged robbery, attorney Remal 
should have called him to testify on Mr. Alvarez's behalf. Her 
failure to do so demonstrates that her representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and, therefore, the first 
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prong of the Strickland test has been met. 
Further, the second prong of Strickland is satisfied. 
"Jesse" had an opportunity to observe Mr. Alvarez right up until 
the alleged robbery took place. Who better, other than Mr. 
Alvarez himself, could testify regarding the defendant's intent 
in going to Smith's that morning. His testimony was important 
because it could have bolstered Mr. Alvarez's testimony while 
undermining Vanessa Milton's credibility. Vanessa Milton's 
credibility is crucial because her testimony is the only direct 
evidence of Mr. Alvarez's guilt. Because "Jesse's" testimony 
would have affected the credibility of the only witness who gave 
direct evidence of Mr. Alvarez's guilt, the fact that he did not 
testify affects the entire evidentiary picture. The conviction, 
therefore, is not strongly supported by the record. Admittedly, 
it is hard to ascertain the exact effect this witness's testimony 
would have on the judgment thus rendered. However, there exists 
a reasonable probability that had this witness testified, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. Because both 
prongs of the Strickland test have been met, Mr. Alvarez was 
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel and therefore, his case should be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
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ADDENDUM 
(Relevant Portions of the Trial Transcript) 
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were no- -
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object to Mr. Spikes1 
testifying. 
THE COURT: Well, I think he's forming a 
hypothetical. Let him finish the question, and then if you 
have an objection you can make it. Mr. Spikes. 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) The question, or hypothetical, 
would be if you were to be told that it was, in fact, 
fingerprinted, and that no usable fingerprints were, in 
fact, lifted, I would ask you if that would be unusual in 
your experience? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would object. I think 
this is asking for speculation. There's also no foundation 
upon which the witness can base his answer. 
THE COURT: Well I'm going to sustain the 
objection on foundational grounds. 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) You indicated that you placed 
Mr. Alvarez under arrest at that point. 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have any conversation with Mr. Alvarez? 
Did you attempt to identify him? 
A Yes, sir, I did. There was no ID on his person, 
and I did ask who he was, his date of birth and things of 
that nature. 
Q Did it appear to you that he understood what you 
r\ r\ r\ M 
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were asking such that he could respond? 
A Yes. 
Q And did he, in fact, respond to those questions? 
A Yes, sir, he did. 
Q What name did he give you when you asked him his 
name? 
A I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or something of 
that nature. 
Q And what date of birth did he give you? 
A I don't recall exactly. I just recall that the 
date of birth, he was a juvenile age. 
Q So what action did you take upon receiving that 
information? 
A Because of the nature of the crime, it's policy 
dictates for us officers, I took him to the police 
department where the SOCO unit photographed him and 
fingerprinted him. 
Q Would you indicate what that is? 
A There's officer's mobile crime labs and so forth 
there responsible for fingerprints and photographs and 
things of that nature. 
Q Did you know what the ultimate process was? 
A Just that we photographed him and fingerprinted 
him, I made contact with an uncle, and then I transported 
him to the detention center. 
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Q Do you know at what point it was determined that 
he, in fact, was not Mr. Madrid? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object without some 
further foundation. 
THE COURT: Will you lay some additional 
foundation, Mr. Spikes? 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) Did you have occasion to 
discover that the name that he gave you was not, in fact, 
his true name? 
A No, sir, I didn't, not until I was subpoenaed 
and pulled the case up and read some supplementary reports. 
Q And what information did you gather during, or 
through that process? 
A That the information given to me was not- -
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, it sounds like this is 
based on hearsay, and I'd object unless there's some other 
foundation for the answer. 
THE COURT: Well he can give his understanding of 
the information, if he knows. I'll have you rephrase the 
question, Mr. Spikes. 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) How was it that you, in fact, 
found that there was at least some question concerning the 
name of Madrid that he gave you? 
A From a follow-up detective. 
Q Do you know what process, what procedure was 
OOP/13 
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taken that would occur to determine that? 
A There was a comparative fingerprint done from 
the print I took at the time of the arrest versus some 
known prints of the defendant, 
Q Okay, Do you know the results of that 
comparison? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, again I'd object, this is 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer. 
THE WITNESS: Just I read in the supplementary 
record that the individual I arrested versus the print of 
the other individual were in fact the same. 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) And with respect to the 
juvenile status, based on the date of birth of the 
individual that you arrested, did you discover additional 
information? 
A That he was an adult, is all. 
Q Did you gather any other evidence from Mr-
Alvarez at the time that you booked him under the name of 
Mr. Madrid? 
A The knife and the money is what was placed in 
evidence-
THE COURT: Lean into the microphone, please, and 
repeat your answer. 
THE WITNESS: The knife that was taken out of the 
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Q Do you know at what point it was determined that 
he, in fact, was not Mr. Madrid? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object without some 
further foundation. 
THE COURT: Will you lay some additional 
foundation, Mr. Spikes? 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) Did you have occasion to 
discover that the name that he gave you was not, in fact, 
his true name? 
A No, sir, I didn't, not until I was subpoenaed 
and pulled the case up and read some supplementary reports. 
Q And what information did you gather during, or 
through that process? 
A That the information given to me was not- -
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, it sounds like this is 
based on hearsay, and I'd object unless there's some other 
foundation for the answer. 
THE COURT: Well he can give his understanding of 
the information, if he knows. I'll have you rephrase the 
question, Mr. Spikes. 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) How was it that you, in fact, 
found that there was at least some question concerning the 
name of Madrid that he gave you? 
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taken that would occur to determine that? 
A There was a comparative fingerprint done from 
the print I took at the time of the arrest versus some 
known prints of the defendant. 
Q Okay, Do you know the results of that 
comparison? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, again I'd object, this is 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer. 
THE WITNESS: Just I read in the supplementary 
record that the individual I arrested versus the print of 
the other individual were in fact the same. 
Q (BY MR. SPIKES) And with respect to the 
juvenile status, based on the date of birth of the 
individual that you arrested, did you discover additional 
information? 
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Q Did you gather any other evidence from Mr. 
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